Geostrategy-Direct
By Richard Fisher
Major militaries around the world have for decades struggled with how to best exploit the information revolution and rapidly emerging space capabilities to better pursue victory on Earth, and this includes China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
In a move that shocked many observers, on April 19 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader and PLA commander Xi Jinping announced a major reorganization of the PLA, namely the division of its latest service, the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), into three new “arms:”
• The PLA Information Support Force (PLAISF);After all, less than one month before on March 27, a South China Morning Post (SCMP) report by Amber Wang hailed the PLASSF, saying “SSF is tasked to future-proof PLA with superior intelligence and reinforced joint operations.”
• The PLA Cyberspace Force (PLACSF); and
• The PLA Aerospace Force (PLAASF).
That article that is now a major example of the SCMP’s deception mission under the control of Chinese state media.
Clearly the CCP and PLA leadership had long before been planning and organizing the division of PLASSF, which was only founded on Dec. 31, 2015 with a Space Systems Department and the Network Systems Department, functions that had been previously organized into departments under the direct control of the CCP’s military-controlling Central Military Commission (CMC).
The idea was that the PLA’s six Theater Commands would have their own subordinate PLASSF command to better integrate information, cyber and space operations to support PLA ground, air, naval and missile forces.
The CCP’s abhorrence of military transparency means that it likely will never explain how the PLASSF’s shortcomings led to its division on April 19, so it is reasonable to speculate.
Some reporting has highlighted recent information about CCP purges of the PLA, such as in the PLA Rocket Force, suggesting a similar dynamic in the PLASSF, but there are likely larger reasons for this reorganization.
First it is likely that it became inefficient and awkward to pile all of the functions of the PLASSF into a single organization.
For example, imagine that a PLA Theater Commander had ordered a major cyber warfare operation, but his PLASSF Theater Commander’s background was in space operations.
A second major reason likely was that the major functions under the PLASSF were themselves becoming increasingly capable of making decisive military contributions, and thus deserved the greater authority and resources commanded by a “service.”
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