Special to WorldTribune, September 11, 2026 Real World News
Geostrategy-Direct, September 8, 2026
For four decades, Iran used non-state proxies in Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen to fuel conflicts far from Iranian borders and project regional leverage at a relatively low cost.
How Iran comes out of the current conflict ‘is a far cry from where Iran was a decade ago.’ / Video Image
But Hamas in Gaza and Hizbullah in Lebanon have been essentially crippled, while Teheran lost a top ally in Syria with the fall of longtime dictator Bashar Assad.
Surviving groups like the Houthis in Yemen and various Iraqi factions are increasingly operating with fragmented, localized autonomy.
Due to these developments, analysts say, the Iranian regime has shifted from aggressive regional expansion to a posture focused on internal survival, institutional recovery, and preserving core asymmetric capabilities.
“The Iranian regime has withstood the blows so far. It’s possible that the regime won’t collapse and that it will continue, in much the same way Saddam’s regime continued throughout the 1990s,” Seth J. Frantzman noted in a Sept. 8 analysis for The Jerusalem Post.
However Iran comes out of the current conflict “is a far cry from where Iran was a decade ago,” Frantzman noted. “It used to feel that it controlled much of the region. IRGC Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani had encouraged Moscow to intervene in Syria in 2015. The Houthis were on the march toward Aden. Hamas felt confident in Gaza. Hizbullah was able to threaten Israel in Lebanon and Syria.”
In 2026, the map of Iranian expansion in the region has been redrawn.
“Iran is still hollowing out countries in the region,” Frantzman noted. “However, it’s possible that some more of its dominoes may fall. Decades of Iranian investment in proxies is no longer paying off.
“Soleimani was killed in 2000 alongside Iraqi militia leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. Iranian proxies have shot their bolt in some cases. Recovery for them will take time. Pressure on them could lead to a lasting defeat for the proxies.”
Even If the Iranian regime doesn’t collapse, a blockaded and weakened Iran may not be able to support its proxies as much.
“Hamas has lost half of Gaza and many of its fighters,” Frantzman noted. “It can be argued that Hamas and Hizbullah are now weakened back to their 2002-2006 levels. They are still dangerous. However, they are different. Israel’s defense technology has also improved exponentially since the 2002-2006 era.”
The area that is controlled by Hamas and Hizbullah is considerably smaller than the 2002-2006 era as well.
With Hamas and Hizbullah weakened, the spotlight is now on the Houthis.
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