By John J. Metzler, September 9, 2024The three-day visit of U.S. National Security advisor Jake Sullivan to Beijing had a clear message; “Don’t Rock the Boat.” Chinese/American relations remain very sensitive over trade tariffs, strategic issues, and Beijing’s continuing military threats to democratic Taiwan and the Philippines.
The mutual political mistrust between Beijing and Washington did not appear to thaw.
At a Beijing press conference Sullivan said, “We believe that competition with China does not have to lead to conflict or confrontation … the key is responsible management through diplomacy.” Through a grueling fourteen hours of discussions with key Chinese communist officials including Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Chairman Xi Jinping, Sullivan apparently did not see any substantive sea change on Beijing’s side.
China’s ruling Communist Party demands the “return of Taiwan to the Motherland,” a non-negotiable mission yet to be achieved by the Beijing regime. While democratically ruled Taiwan has no desire to unite with the communist controlled Mainland, China has never renounced the use of force over seizing the self-governing island. Chinese military jets regularly circle Taiwan like vultures and deliberately veer into its sovereign airspace as a provocation. What’s next?
Related: Weak U.S. response enabling disastrous CCP control of South China Sea, September 4, 2024
Equally Beijing claims large swaths of the South China Sea despite conflicting claims from other countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam.
China’s enigmatic Foreign Minister Wang Yi made it crystal clear to Sullivan that the Taiwan issue is a red line for Beijing’s national interests. Yet later while meeting in the cavernous Great Hall of the People, Chairman Xi Jinping offered a softer view praising long-term Sino/American relations and sending his good wishes to President Biden. Xi likely favors the current Biden Administration over a more politically assertive and strategically focused second term of Donald Trump.
But during a meeting with Gen. Zhang Youxia, Vice Chair of the Central Military Commission, Sullivan was bluntly warned that Taiwan’s status “was the first red line that cannot be crossed in China-U.S. relations.” The general warned, “Taiwan independence and peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are incompatible.” Typical Beijing bluster.
Though the U.S. no longer maintains a formal defense treaty with Taiwan as it does with Japan and South Korea, (it was abrogated during the Carter Administration), the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 passed overwhelmingly by Congress, permits defensive weapons sales to the island and allows the President and Congress to determine appropriate actions during a military crisis. This remains Taiwan’s lifeline.
But behind all the smoke and mirrors and the Palace intrigues of the People’s Republic there are a few key elements often overlooked in the future Chinese power equations. First, while Mainland China and Hong Kong hold a major global economic power, there’s a decided slowdown since the Wuhan virus/ COVID 19 pandemic. Once dizzyingly high economic growth rates have moderated. There’s an aging workforce. China is facing global pushback to its exports.
Recently, Canada’s Trudeau government announced a 100 percent tariff on imports of Chinese-made electric vehicles.
Facing the clear and present dangers from both China and North Korea, Japan’s government is boosting defense spending; a newly proposed budget calls for a record $59 billion for Japanese military spending as part of a plan to raise the defense budget to 2 percent of GDP by 2027.
Since the era of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, defense spending has been on an upward trajectory, now standing at 1.6 percent of GDP. Tokyo is far less apologetic about its increased military spending which was politically and psychologically capped at 1 percent for a generation.
In Taiwan in the meantime, the Ministry of National Defense submitted a new plan which focuses on spending an additional $216 million next year on reserve units, asymmetric warfare systems, command and control resiliency. The Taipei Times cites a report titled, “The Five-Year Force Design and Policy Plan,” which outlines increased military spending of 16 percent over this year’s budget.
At long last Taiwan is taking its own security more seriously with upgraded defense spending and as importantly the expansion of its military reserves. And not a moment too soon.
Which brings us back to Beijing’s policy parameters. First, Taiwan is a non-negotiable “red line.” But recall “red lines” have two sides and can work in two directions.
Second, Beijing’s baseless “historical” claims to the South China Sea’s maritime lanes of communication and scores of small islets are not sanctioned by international law. In fact there’s overlapping claims to the Spratly islands and others by six other states, among them the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan.
These high geopolitical stakes in East Asia glaringly confront global stability both militarily and economically with far reaching implications especially for the United States, Canada and Europe.
John J. Metzler is a United Nations correspondent covering diplomatic and defense issues. He is the author of Divided Dynamism the Diplomacy of Separated Nations: Germany, Korea, China (2014). [See pre-2011 Archives]
